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T
he Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has 
proved to be a unique experiment in banking 
regulation. As the Federal Reserve Governor 
with responsibility for consumer regulation and 
community affairs oversight during much of the 1990s, I 
look back fondly on my experience, along with my good 
friend and then-Comptroller of the Currency Gene Lud-
wig, in working to design the current regulatory scheme 
of the act.
We and others designed those efforts to address the 
shortage of banking services in historically underserved 
communities in the 1990s. The problems then were real. 
Today, it is indisputable that access to banking services 
is far more widespread than it once was; that loans, par-
ticularly for real estate, have become far more abundant 
in underserved areas; and that awareness in the banking 
community of the need to serve the entire community 
has been enhanced. As such, the CRA reforms of the 
early 1990s should be viewed as a success.
However, conditions have changed since then, and 
the problems that preoccupied us a decade and a half 
ago have receded in importance. Therefore, a new look 
at the CRA is in order. To some extent, what has hap-
pened is reminiscent of the old curse, “beware of what 
you wish for, you might just get it.” In some instances, 
too much credit poured into communities that once 
had too little, creating a whole new set of problems. It 
also goes without saying that conditions in the financial 
world have also changed.
One thing that has not changed is my view that 
the proper role for the CRA, as with other government 
activities, is to provide a clearly defined public good. A 
public good is one that is not provided by the market-
place because the costs to provide it exceed the benefits 
accruing to the provider. Public goods therefore are un-
dersupplied because no one individual or organization 
believes it is worth it to invest the money in something 
from which they cannot reap the benefits.
The CRA addresses certain clearly defined public 
goods. These include access to banking services, provi-
sion of credit for real estate development in depressed 
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areas, and (potentially) the provision of credit-related 
services such as consumer credit and home-buyer 
education. As is the case for all public goods, it is criti-
cal to identify why the private marketplace is unable to 
provide the good or service. Then, ideally, the rules and 
regulations should be crafted to address those particular 
problems.
Unfortunately, this “public goods” view of the CRA 
is not widely shared in the body politic, either among 
the CRA proponents and activists or among the act’s 
opponents. Too often, the CRA is viewed and used as a 
vehicle for providing “private goods” that benefit par-
ticular groups or individuals. At times, this devolves into 
what I think of as the Willie Sutton view of the CRA. Sut-
ton, you will recall, was asked why he robbed banks, to 
which he replied: “because that is where the money is.” 
The way the CRA is most commonly implemented 
only exacerbates this public goods problem. When a 
bank is seeking some regulatory favor, such as when it 
is applying for new branches or for a merger, the regula-
tory body approving the application focuses on its CRA 
ratings and overall CRA performance. Regulatory bodies 
by law must seek input from the affected communities. 
Well-organized community groups and elected officials 
know this and threaten to use this process to hamstring 
the bank’s application. This is one of those facts that ev-
eryone knows but declines to discuss in polite company. 
At times, the process devolves into payments by the 
bank to community groups to do “community service.” 
In return, the group either does not object or may even 
endorse the bank’s application. It is all perfectly legal, I 
suppose, but it certainly does have the air of Willie Sut-
ton about it.
This behavior is then viewed by many in the bank-
ing community and among those not typically disposed 
to government meddling in the economy as creating a 
“CRA tax.” This group views the CRA as a cost of doing 
business, and the side payments and inefficient alloca-
tion of credit that may result as part of the price of doing 
something else the bank views as profitable. It is ironic 
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CRA the same way: as a means to extract resources from 
banks. Individuals may differ on whether the recipient 
is deserving, but it is hard to disagree that this kind of 
behavior is inefficient from a social or economic point 
of view. More important, the exchange does nothing to 
address the underlying issue of underprovided public 
goods. The resulting cynicism also can poison the well 
for truly constructive activities related to the CRA, of 
which there are many.
This emerging cynicism is evident in some of the calls 
for CRA expansion today. For example, it was suggested 
as recently as a year ago that the CRA be expanded to 
cover a whole new array of financial institutions, such as 
investment banks—back when we had investment banks. 
Similarly, in the name of leveling the playing field, peo-
ple have called for including brokerage houses and other 
financial institutions. It is hard to make the intellectual 
leap from “serving an entire community,” as commercial 
banks are required to do, to including an investment 
bank, brokerage, or hedge fund under the CRA umbrella. 
Frankly, this lack of compelling logic feeds the view that 
Willie Sutton is back in town.
Stepping away from the view of the CRA as a tax 
and spending program administered through the regula-
tory process will help determine whether the CRA can 
become a stable part of the American banking scene or 
whether it will remain a political lightning rod, drawing 
fire with the vagaries of the political process. This may be 
impossible to pull off. At the moment, CRA proponents 
are ascendant and groups that benefit from them will see 
no reason to compromise. But the ideological bent of the 
body politic will change again, and when it does, pro-
grams that pour money into groups like ACORN, which 
many find lacking in legitimacy, will become targets. 
Finding a stable rationale for the program is unpopular, 
but it will be the key to its viability. 
In holding this view, I am caught between the views 
of most of the CRA community, which believes that the 
CRA is unambiguously good, and the views of CRA crit-
ics, who argue that it is unambiguously bad. It reminds 
me of when I was a professor at Harvard and was intro-
duced on Boston’s PBS station as an “educated conserva-
tive.” I quietly wondered if they ever introduced people 
as educated liberals. But, this being Boston and Public 
Broadcasting, the show’s host felt the need to explain to 
his listeners why they should waste their time on some-
one who didn’t share their perspective. On the other 
hand, during the rewriting of the CRA regulations in the 
early 1990s, I was described in the American Banker as 
having been engaged in “politically correct theatrics.” 
But it is in this centrist view where the “public goods” 
rationale for CRA lies.
The CRA as a Payment for Other Benefits Is 
Not a Public Goods Argument
One of the more sophisticated arguments for expand-
ing CRA coverage to more institutions borrows heavily 
from the public goods position, but is nevertheless inter-
nally flawed. It is that these banks are about to receive 
a variety of other public good benefits and therefore 
should pay the price of taking on a “CRA obligation.” 
Among the benefits supposedly being extended include 
access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window (or 
similar lending facilities) and the possible extension of 
insurance protection such as deposit insurance. 
Two points to be clear on: First, access should not be 
provided to the Discount Window for the private good 
benefit of the financial institution. The Discount Win-
dow and similar lending facilities do not exist to make 
the bank richer. They exist to provide a very important 
public good: temporary liquidity that prevents a financial 
problem from becoming systemic and thereby leading 
to a possibly more widespread financial meltdown. In 
fact, the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window policy fol-
lows the 150-year-old advice of Walter Bagehot to “lend 
freely at a penalty rate.” The purpose of the discount 
window policy is to, first, discourage banks from ac-
cessing the window; second, to provide the money if 
needed; and third, to structure the incentives so that 
banks repay their discount window loans as quickly as 
possible. This is hardly a private benefit and certainly 
not a justification for imposing another “obligation” on a 
financial institution.
The same can be said of deposit insurance. Before 
the advent of deposit insurance, the presumption was 
that the depositor was obliged to determine whether 
a bank was creditworthy. But here is a classic public 
goods problem. The cost of accurately ascertaining and 
then continuously monitoring the creditworthiness of a 
financial institution is prohibitive relative to the interest 
the depositor receives. The private market once solved 
this problem by having banks hold much greater reserves 
than they now do, thereby driving up the cost of borrow-
ing and driving down the return to saving for the bank’s 
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tors and depositors suffered massive losses, followed by 
a loss of confidence (usually exacerbated by the public’s 
inability to discern the bank’s true condition and some-
times fanned by the bank’s competitors). Again, if deposit 
insurance were a private-good benefit to the banks and 
not a public good, it is highly unlikely that Franklin 
Roosevelt would have proposed and Congress passed 
such insurance in the middle of the Depression. Deposit 
insurance is a public good.
The second major fallacy in using these public goods 
as justification for creating a CRA obligation is that pub-
lic goods are provided in and of their own right and are 
never contingent on the provision of other public goods. 
Although some well-meaning people may reason that if 
an institution gets deposit insurance or access to the Dis-
count Window it should also be covered by the CRA, the 
fact is there is no justification for such a position under 
the theory of public goods. What is therefore required is 
a description of what the CRA can do to address a public 
good problem in its own right, which justifies its exis-
tence, independent of other public policy issues.
CRA Public Good Number One:  
Access to the Payment System
There are three areas, I believe, where the CRA is 
entirely justified as a public good on its own merits. 
The first, and most important, is the need to provide 
payment services to the entire population. Today, these 
payment services take three forms: cash, checking, and 
electronic, more typically known as “plastic.” The pub-
lic good in question is the ability for the entire popula-
tion to be linked in a fairly costless manner to these 
forms of payment.
The following illustrates why providing payment 
services is a public good. Consider the case of an em-
ployer or provider of public assistance, which supports 
the population on the income side. If an individual or 
a large class of individuals lacks access to the payment 
system, the position of the employer becomes awkward. 
Typically most employers pay employees by electronic 
transfer to their checking or other bank accounts. This 
is the cheapest and easiest means of payment for the 
employer. It also minimizes the chance of theft or em-
bezzlement, and is by far the easiest way of complying 
with the various taxes that must be withheld from work-
ers’ paychecks and contributions for voluntary fringe 
benefits. Obviously, this requires that employees have 
a bank account. The widespread provision of banking 
services is thus a public good from which nearly every 
employer in the country benefits.
An employee, of course, may request a paper pay-
check. That form of payment, however, is more costly 
both in time and in direct expense to both the employer 
and employee. Ultimately, however, the paycheck must 
either be deposited into a bank account or converted 
into cash. The former requires a bank. The latter requires 
some entity willing to cash the check. It is true that 
check cashing services have sprung up in the private 
sector to serve these individuals, but transaction costs 
are extremely high. It is not that these services are 
“gouging” their customers, but that their own transac-
tion costs are quite high, particularly identity verifica-
tion and the risks involved in recovering bad checks. 
This is clearly a high-cost and very inefficient substitute 
for standard banking services. 
A similarly huge cost advantage exists in the case 
of payment for goods and services. Customers make 
purchases either using checks or electronic methods 
such as credit and debit cards, both of which require 
access to the banking system for settlement, or through 
cash. The latter technically does not need access to the 
banking system, but the widespread development of an 
ATM network has certainly shown the significant cost 
advantages and economies in cash balances that a bank-
ing system can provide. Firms also need access to banks 
for payment services, particularly for cash. Easy access 
to deposit windows at the end of the day or even access 
during the day for the proverbial roll of quarters greatly 
facilitates the conduct of commerce.
Given the benefits of banking services, their avail-
ability across a wide variety of neighborhoods and 
communities is also a public good. This was clearly 
brought home to me as a Fed Governor when I went on 
community tours and saw areas with large congrega-
tions of people but no banks. One place that sticks in 
my memory is Houston’s Fifth Ward, a primarily African 
American community. Small businesses were few, and 
residents had to travel long distances to access banks. 
A major national banking institution opened a branch 
there, and within a year demand was so high that its 
only major problem was acquiring the land next door to 
add more drive-up teller windows. 
The CRA requirements that retail banking institutions 
expand their services to the entire area they intend to 
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not mean that the concentration of bank branches must 
be the same in every neighborhood or the same as it 
is in the center of town. The density of bank branches 
should still be subject to commercial considerations. 
Reasonable metrics for appropriate concentrations are 
easily calculated and the regulatory staffs at the Federal 
Reserve and the U.S. Comptroller’s Office are capable of 
determining branch dispersion levels that meet minimum 
CRA criteria.
It is equally true that this requirement should not 
apply to financial institutions that do not provide retail 
access to the payment system. Nor does it follow under 
the theory of public goods that exemption from this CRA 
requirement means that we must find some other CRA 
requirement as a substitute. Remember, the provision of 
one public good does not depend on the provision of 
another. Just because Goldman Sachs provides no retail 
access to the payment system and is therefore not subject 
to a geographic test on the distribution of its nonexistent 
branches, it does not mean that CRA must invent some 
other “CRA tax” to impose on Goldman in the name of 
fairness. On the other hand, should Goldman decide to 
enter the retail banking business and provide branches to 
its clients in Scarsdale and Greenwich, then this aspect of 
the CRA should apply.
CRA Public Good Number Two: 
Real Estate Lending
Redlining is what garnered the CRA its greatest visi-
bility—the demarcation of areas in which banks would 
not make loans. Interestingly, the practice of redlining 
did not start in the banking industry, but in government. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, New York was undergoing 
a dramatic transformation as people were moving to the 
suburbs in increasing numbers. City planners, notably 
Robert Moses, squared the city’s budget commitments 
with the declining population and tax base by deciding 
to withdraw city services such as police protection from 
certain neighborhoods that were rapidly depopulating. 
Of course, the withdrawal of these services merely ac-
celerated the decline of these neighborhoods.
In my five years as the Federal Reserve Governor 
responsible for the CRA, and in my capacity as chairman 
of the board of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corpo-
ration (now known as NeighborWorks), I visited many 
inner-city neighborhoods and talked to a wide variety of 
their residents and community leaders. Clearly, the lack 
of access to banking services and lending was a concern, 
but rarely was it the primary concern. Invariably, the lack 
of some vital city service such as police or fire protection 
or decent schools was at the top of the list.
This experience demonstrated the public good nature 
of residential real estate. An individual could invest large 
sums of money in building a wonderful home in an 
otherwise depressed neighborhood and find that the in-
vestment was not reflected in the home’s property value. 
As real estate agents are fond of saying when they sell 
homes: “Location, location, location.” 
However, the public good aspect of residential real 
estate also explains why banks and other financial 
institutions might choose not to make mortgage loans in 
a given neighborhood. If an individual is about to invest 
money in a building and there is little reason to expect 
that the investment will produce a commensurate rise in 
the value of the property, it would be a violation of the 
bank’s fiduciary responsibility to its depositors to offer 
a loan to that individual. The collateral behind the loan 
would simply not justify the transaction.
Of course, this is where the problem of public goods 
becomes sticky. If it is not prudent for any financial in-
stitution to make a loan to an individual who is willing 
to invest in a property in a neighborhood, then money 
will not flow into the neighborhood. If money does not 
flow into that neighborhood, then no improvements will 
be made. If no improvements are made, then the condi-
tion of the neighborhood will never improve. A vicious 
circle develops.
The CRA provides one avenue for breaking this vi-
cious circle, and with that a second public good justi-
fication for the act. The logic begins with a theoretical 
proposition. If it were possible for all banks servicing 
a metropolitan area to collectively guarantee that they 
would each make a given amount of loans to a de-
pressed community, then at least the public good prob-
lem of arranging finance would be removed. Borrowers, 
lenders, and investors would not have to fear that their 
properties would face valuation problems because sur-
rounding properties could not get the credit needed to 
make similar improvements.
The set of CRA regulations we developed in the 
1990s builds on this theoretical foundation. Banks were 
required to geocode their loans by census tract; that is 
they identified where exactly they were lending. This 
lending metric was then measured in the context of the 
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tracts, and banks’ lending performance from a CRA 
context was based on that evaluation. In effect, the CRA 
established a set of geographically based soft quotas for 
banks to meet under the Lending Test.
No system is perfect, but this approach seemed 
optimal among the various constraints under which 
the CRA operates. First, it provided the framework to 
offer assurance of access to funds in underserved areas. 
Second, it allowed individual institutions to select which 
loans they wanted to make and even which underserved 
census tracts they wished to target, subject to an overall 
minimum threshold. Third, it emphasized measurable 
performance and not the subjective criteria of protests 
and public comment, which experience had taught were 
easily gamed.
As such programs go, the CRA regulations were 
indisputably successful. The question now being de-
bated is whether the program was “too much of a good 
thing” and bears some responsibility for the so-called 
“subprime crisis” the country has been experiencing. 
There are undoubtedly some legitimate criticisms of CRA 
regulations in this regard, but responsibility for the credit 
cycle is much wider and includes the behavior of bor-
rowers and lenders, regulatory breakdown, and political 
machinations of both parties.
The widespread finger pointing underway recalls the 
old lesson children are taught that when you point a 
finger at someone else you are simultaneously pointing 
three back at yourself. So, as someone who played a role 
in writing these regulations, let me take a look at those 
three fingers and consider some of the potential flaws in 
program design.
First, like all soft quotas, the CRA program was 
designed to meet the needs of the period in which the 
rules were written. But, by definition, the success of the 
program made those criteria somewhat outdated. In the 
early 1990s, the credit needs of these communities were 
horrifically unmet. Clearly, creditworthy (and profit-
able) individuals could be found, particularly given that 
the public good problem of lending in distressed areas 
was being addressed. These creditworthy borrowers got 
loans. As time went on, however, the requirements for 
the number of loans made did not change. In fact, it 
would be a real CRA black eye for a bank to reduce the 
number of loans it was making in a particular area. How-
ever, given that the most creditworthy borrowers had 
already received loans, a somewhat less creditworthy 
group had to take their place. As time went on, lending 
standards had to be relaxed to avoid any “backsliding” 
on an institution’s CRA obligations. In this way, the CRA 
did contribute to a downgrading of credit standards. 
Second, the Investment Test under the CRA and the 
related deals the Justice Department struck with Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac during the 1990s created a natural 
market for securitizing these loans. Of course, securitiza-
tion was occurring in its own right on a wide scale, but 
most securitization involved fixed lending criteria estab-
lished by the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). 
Given the problems discussed in point one above, an 
enormous market opened for securities of nonconform-
ing loans, which involved some CRA credit that fell short 
of the Investment Test. This was a good thing in that it 
allowed credit to flow to underserved areas in far greater 
quantities than before, but the securitization of non-
conforming loans involved a much greater risk, with far 
more pernicious consequences, than the securitization 
of conforming loans. By definition, nonconforming loans 
are more idiosyncratic, harder to monitor and model, 
and generally more geographically or socioeconomically 
concentrated than conforming loans. The CRA did not 
recognize this risk, and in fact gave a reason to ignore 
the risks inherent in the process. In this way, the CRA 
and the related Justice Department arrangements with 
the GSEs exacerbated the securitization problems in the 
subprime crisis.
Third, the very fact of “opening the flood gates” on 
credit exacerbated a normal problem in credit cycles 
which tends to mask risk, and thereby leads to greater 
excesses in the cycle. The CRA itself was part of this, but 
hardly the major element. Rather, it was the changing 
of the rules of the game that caused an abrupt shift. The 
story is as old as credit cycles. When credit suddenly 
becomes more available in any market, demand rises for 
the assets being financed. The very fact of rising prices 
leads to a lower rate of defaults and loan losses given 
that the rise in asset prices allows troubled borrowers to 
dispose of the asset and repay the loan easily. The lending 
community tends to view this as a reduction in risk and 
therefore lends more, pushing asset prices up further, 
defaults down, and thereby leading to even more easing 
of credit terms and more excesses. When the cycle ends 
and prices start to fall, the fundamental riskiness of lend-
ing in this market not only returns but is magnified. 
This latter observation is also a comment in general 
on the development and crash of the latest housing bub-
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took on steam, as all bubbles do, as the rising prices in-
creased demand and still more credit. The CRA is not the 
cause of this phenomenon; the cycle has been well docu-
mented since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble in 
the 1600s. All bubbles are built on the fundamentals of 
human nature. Therefore, I am not saying the CRA caused 
the subprime crisis. But, it would be equally wrong to 
deny that the CRA played no part of that process.
Nor does it follow that the flaws in CRA design mean 
that the policy is a bad one. The world does not provide 
us with pristine policy options, only tradeoffs. Just as it 
was probably logical from a macroeconomic viewpoint 
to allow for the general expansion of credit in the 1990s 
and 2000s, so too was it logical to have a CRA program. 
Those who point fingers at particular entities and accuse 
them of being the “culprits” behind the crisis are wide of 
the mark.
On balance, there are two logical lessons from this 
experience. First, the Investment Test provides the wrong 
incentives for CRA lending; it is not truly meeting an ob-
vious public goods market failure. Nonconforming loans 
require closer monitoring, and therefore securitizing them 
causes a greater breakdown than securitizing conforming 
loans. It follows that the wholesale expansion of the CRA 
to other financial institutions, creating an Investment Test 
obligation for them, will prove counterproductive.
Second, designers of the next set of CRA regulations 
must tackle a problem that has bedeviled the CRA from 
its inception. Does the CRA require banks to make loans 
that are less creditworthy than those the financial institu-
tion is making elsewhere? The experience of the last bub-
ble indicates yes, although that was neither the intent nor 
the rhetoric of those who implemented the current CRA. 
Answering this question with a definitive NO in the next 
round of CRA reform would certainly dispel the idea that 
the CRA is a “tax” or worse. On the other hand, it strikes 
me as highly unlikely that the bulk of those pushing for 
CRA expansion would choose to definitively answer this 
question in the negative.
CRA Public Good Number Three:  
Consumer Education
The current financial meltdown includes individual 
stories of such debt and shockingly bad decisions that 
one has to wonder, “What were they thinking?” In 
some cases, the fault clearly lies with financial services 
providers who were deceptive or possibly even fraudu-
lent. More commonly, lenders complied with the letter 
of the law, but competition for customers created ever 
more lenient credit terms. There is a legitimate debate 
about the proper roles of caveat emptor and caveat ven-
dor, but the legal distinction here is not a public good 
question, given that it is a matter of placing the private 
burden of caution between borrower and lender.
What is a matter of public good is that borrowers 
sufficiently understand the role of finance in their lives 
such that they can make reasonably informed deci-
sions. Increasing such knowledge not only lowers the 
likelihood of a taxpayer-funded bailouts, but it also 
lowers the cost of providing credit generally given that 
overall losses should be lower.
Public schools have begun to take on this chal-
lenge, and they are a natural way to provide such a 
public good. The curriculum is well intended, but 
from personal experience, teachers need more train-
ing themselves. My son had to do a monthly budget, 
a good learning experience. The budget included 
buying transportation, and the students were allowed 
to finance a car for 36 months. My son used an online 
monthly payment calculator that different car dealers 
offer. The teacher marked his budget wrong because 
apparently her notion of finance was to take the cost of 
the car and divide by 36! When I wrote in and pointed 
out that we have such a thing as interest in this world, 
she relented, apparently having learned something for 
the first time.
The notion that banks should meet the credit needs 
of their entire community might certainly include 
teaching basic financial literacy, since apparently the 
entire community (or vast portions of it) appears to lack 
it. Here the nonprescriptive nature of CRA might well 
be an advantage given that what is clearly needed is 
some creativity in how to provide consumer education. 
Some institutions use classes, others, particularly in by-
gone days, ran weekly savings programs in the schools. 
But if CRA regulators are looking for an alternative to 
the lending tests and branching tests described above, 
certainly funding of consumer education programs 
would warrant consideration.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Conclusion
The financial crisis the nation now finds itself in offers 
a natural opportunity to reconsider how the Community 
Reinvestment Act should be structured. But it is also a 
time when the central objectives of the financial regula-
tory community should be focused on other issues, nota-
bly capital adequacy and underlying safety and sound-
ness. Although the political setting offers an opportunity 
for expanding the CRA, the economic setting will likely 
push the CRA to a back seat.
That is why it is critical that the CRA adopt a public 
goods stance and distance itself from a reputation of ex-
tracting commitments from banks. Once it is clear that the 
duty of the bank is to benefit the entire community, and 
not special pieces of it when community leverage is great-
est, more people will support a sustainable CRA approach 
and compliance will be much easier. That should be the 
focus of the Congress in the next few years as it considers 
changes to the Community Reinvestment Act.   
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